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Abstract— This paper examines the impact of 
environmental tax on SME innovation and how SME 
financing constraint moderates this relationship. Given the 
paucity of research on the implications of financing 
constraints on SMEs’ green innovative activities, the study 
adopts cross-country panel data to investigate the impact of 
environmental tax on SME’s innovative activities across 24 
OECD countries for the period 2000-2019. Results from our 
study indicate that an increase in environmental tax leads 
to a decrease in SME innovation. Further, we also find that 
financing constraint positively moderates the relationship 
between environmental tax and SME innovation. Our 
findings shed new light on the theoretical and practical 
implications of financing constraints on SMEs’ green 
innovative activities. 
Index Terms— Green-Innovation, Environmental Tax, SME 
Financial Constraints, Governance. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
S environmental concerns have increased, this has given 
rise to greater awareness and urgency to promote 
environmental policies that can arrest the rapid increase in 
greenhouse emissions. Therefore, the main focus of research 
has been to pursue practices and policies that promote 
innovative approaches that mitigate the negative impact of past 
and present practices that lead to climate degradation (Afrifa et 
al., 2020). Governments have acknowledged that poor 
corporate governance and regulatory framework has led to 
environmental degradation (Elmaggrhi et al., 2019 and He et 
al., 2021). To address the economic malaise and reduce 
unemployment, OECD countries have promoted market-based 
environmental policies to enhance competitiveness through 
innovative green projects (McLaughlin et al., 2019). However, 
whether there is a relationship between environmental policies 
and innovation remains under-explored (Chen et al., 2018; Shao 
et al., 2020).  
It is suggested (Lundgren and Zhou, 2017) that firms being 
responsible citizens should proactively pursue environmentally 
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friendly policies as a strategic tool to align with societal 
expectations as part of a corporate social responsibility agenda. 
However, the evidence on the relationship between innovation, 
environmental regulations and firms’ competitiveness is sparse. 
This suggests that there is a gap and that there is a need to 
examine the interconnectedness between firms’ green 
investment and environmental management.   
SMEs are major users of energy that contribute towards gas 
emissions, which are responsible for environmental 
degradation. In equal measure, SMEs are major contributors to 
a country's economic growth (Naucler et al., 2012). Given the 
importance of SMEs for the economy's wellbeing and the 
environment, there is an expectation that enterprises, being 
socially responsible, would pursue environmentally friendly 
practices to reduce the negative impact of their operations on 
the environment (Chege and Wang, 2020; Lundgren and Zhou, 
2017). There has been a realisation amongst OECD countries 
that they need to adopt innovative practices through 
technological development to reduce pollution, which has been 
since the 1960s (Bergek and Berggren, 2014). However, the 
rapid acceleration of greenhouse emissions has heightened the 
need for incentives and regulations to innovate and adapt clean 
technology. To persuade the industry to transition from 
polluting technologies towards clean practices, there has been a 
policy shift where economic instruments, such as CO2 taxes 
and trading emission approaches, address environmental 
concerns (Bergek and Berggren, 2014; Song, Wang, & Zhang, 
2020). The goal of environmental taxes is to promote 
innovation in industry to reduce greenhouse emissions. It is 
suggested that tax instruments are an efficient means to 
encourage SMEs to adopt emission reduction technologies 
instead of regulatory persuasions (Bergquist et al., 2013; 
Bergek and Berggren, 2014). This suggestion is plausible 
because firms will innovate and adopt technology to maintain 
economic efficiency, especially fiscal incentives (i.e. pull 
factors such as subsidies) and CO2 taxation (push factors) (Yu 
& Cheng, 2021). Persuasive regulations alone are insufficient 
to induce a behaviour change in SMEs’ innovation and 
adaptation of green technologies. As rational actors, economic 
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choices are dictated by profit motives which persuasive 
regulations alone cannot circumvent.               
The economic paradigm of environmental regulation 
suggests that taxes add to costs. Porter and van der Linde (1995) 
argue that environmental regulation instruments, such as taxes, 
can persuade firms to innovate, offset the cost of complying 
with environmental regulations. However, not all regulations 
are conducive to innovation. It is suggested that purposefully 
designed regulations effectively achieve the desired objective 
and target polluters such as small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs). SMEs are a significant contributor to GDP and 
employment (Arshad et al., 2020; Woźniak et al., 2019) and 
occupy a significant portion of the economy, impacting the 
environment.  
The environmental tax aims to discourage SMEs from 
polluting the environment and push them towards innovation 
and the adoption of clean technology. However, there are side-
effects of environmental taxes that inadvertently impact 
negatively on innovation and diffusion amongst SMEs. Such 
negative effects have not received sufficient attention in the 
literature, and discussions on the impact of an environmental 
tax on financing constraints are inconclusive. Requate (2005: 
193) suggests that "instruments which provide incentive 
through the price mechanism, by and large, perform better than 
command and control policies". This is due to a firm’s 
unwillingness to be more efficient than expected. 
Additionally, environmental taxes seek cooperation from 
SMEs willing to reduce pollution beyond their expected level. 
For there to be an effective pollution reduction, this requires 
financial investment. However, SMEs, especially smaller 
enterprises, tend to have financial constraints (Bodlaj, et al., 
2020; Gupta and Barua 2018), which limit their ability to 
innovate and adopt clean technology. Tax instruments are used 
to discourage SMEs from pursuing polluting technologies and 
persuade SMEs, instead, to move to a non-emission 
infrastructure.   
Existing studies on the policies that address environmental 
concerns tend to focus on infrastructure and technological 
issues (Pan et al., 2021; Chatzimentor et al., 2020) whilst 
omitting the impact of taxation and finance-related concerns. 
Clean technology infrastructure is capital intensive. Therefore, 
policy formulation needs to integrate the financial instruments 
that enable SMEs to engage with environmentally friendly 
operations. This implies that an analysis that examines 
environmental regulatory instruments, and its impact on SMEs’ 
innovation, needs to consider financial constraints. This 
suggests the need for a more informed insight into the linkages 
between development, clean technology, and taxation.       
The purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of an 
environmental tax on SMEs’ innovation and how SMEs’ 
financing constraint moderates this relationship. Hence, this 
research will prove the effect of tightening environmental 
policies on financing and innovation in OECD countries. To 
achieve this objective, the study adopts cross-country panel data 
to investigate the impact of environmental tax on SMEs’ 
innovative activities. The data set covers 24 OECD countries 
for the period 2000-2019. The results of this study suggest that 
environmental taxes have a negative impact on SMEs’ 
innovation. Furthermore, the findings show that financing 
constraints moderate the relationship between environmental 
tax and SMEs’ innovation.  
This paper contributes both to the literature on the use and 
impact of environmental taxes on SMEs’ innovation and 
finance constraints. This cutting-edge research, to our 
knowledge is the first study to examine the relationship between 
environmental, finance constraint, and SMEs’ innovation. 
These empirical findings demonstrate the negative relationship 
between environmental tax and innovation. Developing 
policies to mitigate the negative impact of environmental taxes 
will ensure the desired outcomes of the policy are achieved; this 
will promote innovation agenda and provide an impetus for 
sustainable economic development.  Our findings are consistent 
with prior research (Cai et al., 2018; Shao and Xiao, 2019; 
Damihamedani et al., 2018), indicating that tax impacts firm 
innovation negatively, which suggests a negative effect tax on 
financing constraints. Furthermore, this empirical study builds 
on the findings of existing studies and extends knowledge in 
that it investigates the impact of an environmental tax on SME 
innovation and how SME financing constraints moderates this 
relationship. This understanding will enable practitioners and 
policy makers to be mindful of the relationship when 
developing interventions.   
We conduct a series of tests to reduce the fear that other 
economic factors do not confound our results. First, we perform 
a 2-stage instrumental variable baseline analysis as an 
identification strategy to tackle endogeneity issues. Second, we 
adopt propensity score matching in order to reduce any 
potential selection and omitted variable biases. Third, we also 
incorporated a country-level alternative measure of innovation 
to provide a broader scope of its impact on environmental tax -
innovation sensitivity. Lastly, we explore our analysis' 
sensitivity to financial crises. Overall, we find our baseline 
results remain robust to all the above robustness checks. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. A brief review 
of the pertinent literature is provided in section 2. 
Methodological considerations are considered and discussed in 
section 3. In section 4, we report and discuss the empirical 
results. Finally, in section 5, we provide the conclusions and 
make recommendations.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. Theoretical Framework 
Environmental concerns and implications have gained 
traction within developed and emerging economies (Hopkinson 
et al., 2018). Emerging literature explores green innovation, 
sustainable development, and circular economy (Jiang et al., 
2020). The values of assets are informed by managers choice of 
clean technology utilised to produce innovative goods and 
services. Thus, there is a causal link between clean technology 
and the environment; this is further interconnected with the 
financing decisions of SMEs and government taxation policies. 
The separation between owners and managers complicates 
decisions relating to the adoption of clean technology; 
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managers' choices of clean technology may differ from 
shareholders preferences. Essentially, finance mediates the 
theoretical linkage between shareholders (Hoskisson et al., 
2018; Le et al., 2020) and resource-based view theories (RBV). 
Therefore, whilst considering stakeholder theory, this research 
employs the resource-based view to examine the impact of an 
environmental tax on SMEs financing and innovation to 
mitigate the adverse impact of environmental hazards. Thus, we 
use the RBV to explain the relationships between 
environmental tax, financing constraint and SMEs’ innovation 
in OECD countries.  The RBV theory is based on the premise 
that resources are a significant contributor to the SMEs’ ability 
to innovate and adopt clean technologies, but resources 
(financial and others) are scare (Barney, 1991; Kraaijenbrink et 
al., 2010;) and this involves choices, and when the cost is in the 
form of environmental taxes, this further complicates the price 
signalling mechanisms in a competitive market. Thus, the 
environmental taxes that are used to reduce pollution give rise 
to a cost that affects resource allocation; hence, environmental 
taxes have the capacity to impact a SMEs’ competitive 
advantage in the marketplace (Jun et al., 2019; Yacob et al., 
2019; Yang, 2019). There is a strong relationship between 
SMEs’ access to finance, innovation and competitiveness 
within the marketplace (Adegboye and Iweriebor, 2018).  
Mac and Bhaird (2010) postulate that, for a firm to have a 
sustainable competitive advantage and innovate within the 
market, it ought to have effective and efficient financial 
(tangible and intangible) resources. Financial resources are the 
prerequisite to innovation. Thus, these are critical to enabling 
SMEs to implement change to mitigate the impact of 
environmental taxes, thereby sustaining competitive prices to 
ensure that product demand is not adversely affected (Bergner 
et al., 2017; Nozawa and Managi, 2019). Hence, SMEs with 
access to financial resources can reduce gas emissions, invest 
in clean technology, maintain market share, build an eco-
friendly brand, and reduce gas emissions to safeguard the 
environment.    
B. Environmental Tax, Financing Constraint and SMEs 
Innovation 
Environmental policy instruments that aim to foster 
sustainability tend to be non-prescriptive, such as taxes and cap-
and-trade systems (Liao, 2018; Bergek and Berggren, 2014). 
However, carbon taxes are targeted to replace polluting 
technologies with efficient and environmentally friendly 
economic activities. In theory, SMEs should benefit from clean 
technology. They may receive economic compensation for not 
incurring social costs by polluting the environment (Lv et al., 
2021). Environmental regulatory instruments (financial and 
technical) control firms' actions by setting acceptable standards 
that cause a behaviour change. Some of these regulatory 
instruments are prescribed whilst others are optional, which 
firms may choose to comply with to enhance their social 
credentials (Bergek and Berggren, 2014) and brand 
competitiveness.  
Taxation policies through price mechanisms incentivise 
firms to use or innovate clean technologies to reduce pollution. 
Some SMEs will merely comply with the mandatory 
requirements whilst others exceed their mandatory standards 
(Bergquist et al., 2013). Taxation policies are politically 
sensitive as they are not well received due to their impact on 
consumer prices and SMEs’ profit. Taxation unequally affects 
different stakeholders: the larger population bears the penalty 
for polluting the environment (Noailly, 2012). Thus, affecting 
behaviour change through carbon taxes and promoting 
innovation poses economic, social, and political challenges 
(Zhang and Zhang, 2018; Barrage, 2020). Therefore, the 
challenge for researchers is to disaggregate the impact of an 
environmental tax on SMEs innovation due to scarcity of 
energy that leaves limited choices for firms. 
Fiscal instruments are used for a range of objectives; 
however, environmental taxes are specific to lowering polluting 
activities through incentives that enable firms to adopt clean 
technology. Firms that invest in sustainable technologies are 
compensated with lower carbon taxes, and SMEs polluting the 
environment are penalised through higher taxes. Environmental 
tax policies drive SMEs to use clean technologies to avoid tax 
costs (Lv et al., 2021). Fiscal policy is distinct from regulatory 
instruments, prescribed regulations that ensure that SMEs 
comply with specific requirements to avoid penalties (Bergek 
and Berggren, 2014). However, the carbon tax impact on 
product prices motivates SMEs to innovate and develop clean 
technologies. Such fiscal policies have political and economic 
implications for inducing SMEs to innovate (Zhang et al., 2020; 
Caldera et al., 2019; Barrage, 2020). Raising taxes makes the 
political establishment unpopular, as this leads to higher prices. 
In contrast, the regulatory policies are more directed at SMEs 
to employ clean technologies; thus, the cost is borne by SMEs 
(Marin et al., 2015). However, the adoption of clean 
technologies burdens SMEs with a higher cost that negatively 
impacts them because they lack the resources for innovation 
(Bakar et al., 2020). Also, there exists a risk of market failures, 
including information asymmetry and competitive advantages 
for SMEs. To address the market anomaly, SMEs may reduce 
innovation costs and allocate resources in financing innovation 
projects. As a result, product value can be increased to achieve 
green productivity. 
Shareholder theory (Le et al., 2020) links environmental 
concerns that SMEs have to respond to mitigate the adverse 
impact of gas emissions. According to Chithambo et al. (2021), 
stakeholders have a crucial role in adverting the adverse impact 
of gas emissions. In responding to these stakeholder pressures, 
SMEs are now adopting innovative, cutting-edge technologies 
to mitigate their environmental pollution activities to enhance 
their performance (See Boakye et al., 2021; 2020). 
Governments have attempted to use environmental regulatory 
tools to effect behaviour change; one such policy is 
environmental tax (Elmagrhi et al., 2019; Doan et al., 2021). 
Figure 1, the conceptual framework, illustrates the causal 
relationship between environmental tax and SMEs innovation 
to mitigate environmental degradation. This gives rise to 
whether environmental tax policy discourages environmental 
pollutions, as observed in He et al. (2021). Financial theory 
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suggests that environmental tax is a cost element that reduces 
the finance level available for SMEs to innovate, as illustrated 
in figure 1 below. This, therefore, raises important questions. 
Firstly, will environmental tax increase the cost of SMEs or not. 
Secondly, does financing constraint play a role in this 
relationship to determine whether or not environmental tax 
burdens SMEs innovation?   
 
Environmental tax leads to finance constraints for SMEs that 
negatively impact a firm’s innovation and adoption of clean 
technologies (Aghion et al., 2012; Brancati, 2015; Hall and 
Sena, 2017). Financially constrained SMEs are less likely to 
invest in green technologies or innovation due to the risk of 
failure (Madrid-Guijarro et al., 2016). This is further 
corroborated by Silva and Carreira (2012), who report a 
negative relationship between SMEs’ financial constraints and 
innovation. These findings are also supported by Loof and 
Nabavi (2016). Adopting technology and innovation is 
negatively associated with capital constraints. The introduction 
of carbon taxes exacerbates the SMEs’ ability to finance 
constraining technology. Innovation is negatively associated 
with capital constraints, and the introduction of carbon taxes 
exacerbates SMEs' financing constraints. The literature on 
finance constraint focuses on information asymmetry, financial 
constraint, collateral, and financial institutions’ rigidities in 
their lending policies towards high-risk technology to reduce 
gas emissions (Harvie, et al., 2013; Xiang et al., 2019). The tax 
literature is focused on the administration of corporate tax 
regimes and the effect on innovation (Cai et al., 2018; Shao and 
Xiao, 2019; Damihamedani et al., 2018). For example, Cai et 
al. (2018) examined the impact of a switch in corporate tax 
collection from local to state tax bureau on firm innovation. 
Similarly, Shao and Xiao (2019) explored the causality of 
corporate tax on firm innovation in developing countries whilst, 
Damihamedani et al. (2018) evaluate the relationship between 
corporate tax and innovative entrepreneurship. However, extant 
empirical findings examine the relationship between 
environmental tax and its impact on SMEs’ financing 
constraints and innovation. Thus, this study attempts to fill in 
an important gap in the literature that examines the impact of 
environmental taxes and their unintended consequences for 
SMEs innovation.   
This empirical research examines how financial constraints 
and environmental taxes affect SMEs’ innovation amongst 
OECD countries. Therefore, this study using OECD countries 
data firstly examines the impact of an environmental tax on 
SMEs innovation capabilities and consequences for achieving 
gas emission reduction. We propose our first hypothesis: 
H1: Environmental tax has a negative impact on SMEs’ 
innovation      
The second hypothesis explores the causes and consequences 
of an environmental tax on SMEs financing prospects and how 
this impacts SME innovation capabilities. Based on this, we 
propose our following hypothesis: 
H2: The relationship between environmental tax and SMEs’ 
innovation is positively moderated by finance constraints. 
III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
A. Data and Sample  
The study adopts cross-country panel data to investigate the 
impact of environmental tax on SMEs’ innovative activities. 
Our data set covers 24 OECD countries for the period 2000-
2019. We collected data on the environmental tax from the 
OECD and Innovation and SME financing constraints from the 
Global Entrepreneurship monitor. We also use the World Bank 
Development Indicators (WBDI) data to capture the individual 
governance indicators, GDP, interest rates and inflation. In 
contrast, data was captured from the World Bank Development 
Indicators (WBDI). The countries included are as follows: 
Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, U.K., Slovenia, Latvia, Canada, and the USA. The 
sample of countries employed in the data is shown in Table 1. 
B. Variable Definitions  
This paper's primary dependent variable is innovation, 
proxied by the percentage of R&D to GDP. Several studies have 
used R&D expenditure to measure innovation (Afrifa et al., 
2020; Cirera et al., 2016). For instance, Afrifa et al. (2020) 
adopted R&D in their study to measure innovation efforts. 
According to Afrifa et al. (2020), R&D expenditure provides 
much robust evidence of firms and countries' scientific and 
technological efforts compared to other types of innovative 
measurements. The advantage of using R&D expenditure as a 
measure of innovation is that it is easily quantifiable. It 
demonstrates the extent to which national research and 
development lead to the new commercial opportunities 
available to firms (Cirera et al., 2016). This paper's main 
independent variable is environmental tax, measured as a tax 
whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) that has a 
proven specific negative impact on the environment. Several 
prior studies have similarly used this measure to capture 
environmental tax policies among several countries (Lu et al., 
2019; Wang and Yu, 2021).  In the study, we also adopt the 
availability of financial resources—equity and debt—for small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) to capture the SME financing 
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constraint.  
To control factors that may impact the relationship between 
environmental tax and SME’s innovative activities, we 
controlled specific country-level characteristics, including 
inflation, GDP, and interest rate. The inflation rate is 
determined by constant changes in the general prices of goods 
and services produced within a country. Prior studies, including 
Funk and Kromen (2010), demonstrate that inflation negatively 
impacts firms' innovation. The level of economic growth 
impacts the level of innovation made by firms. Firms operating 
in high growth countries tend to be more innovative than their 
peers in low growth countries (Demirel and Danisman, 2019; 
Lee, 2018). In view of this, GDP is measured in terms of real 
GDP growth rate to capture the country's overall economic 
activities. Following the World Economic Outlook 2020 report, 
we measure GDP as the total value at constant prices of goods 
and services produced within a country in a year. Interest rate 
is captured using long-term interest rates charged by 
government bonds maturing in ten years. Long-term rates 
impact the firm's investment and innovative activities. Given 
the impact of governance on innovative and economic activities 
within a country, we further examine the moderating influence 
of country-level governance factors, including political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, and 
control of corruption, on the impact of an environmental tax on 
SME’s innovative activities. 
C. Econometric Model  
To examine the relationship between environmental tax, the 
SME financing constraint and SME’s innovative activities, the 
following regression equation was estimated: 
 
 𝑰𝒏𝒏𝒐𝒗𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 = 𝜶𝒊 + 𝟏𝐄𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐭𝐚𝐱𝒊𝒕  +

𝟐
𝑺𝑴𝑬 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝟑𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒊𝒕 + 𝟒𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒏𝒊𝒕 +

𝟓
𝑰𝒏𝒕𝒆𝒓𝒆𝒔𝒕 𝒓𝒂𝒕𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝟔𝐄𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐭𝐚𝐱 ∗
𝑺𝑴𝑬 𝑭𝒊𝒏𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝒊𝒕 +  𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔𝒊 +
𝑪𝒐𝒖𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝒆𝒇𝒇𝒆𝒄𝒕𝒔𝒊𝒕 +
 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                                                               (1)    
To examine the interaction influences of political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of 
corruption on the relationship between environmental tax and 
SME’s innovative activities, we estimated the following 
econometric Equation: 
 𝐈𝐧𝐧𝐨𝐯𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐢𝐭
= 𝛂𝐢 + 𝟏𝐄𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐭𝐚𝐱𝐢𝐭  + 𝟐𝐒𝐌𝐄 𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐢𝐭
+ 
𝟑
𝐆𝐃𝐏𝐢𝐭 + 𝟒𝐈𝐧𝐟𝐥𝐚𝐭𝐢𝐨𝐧𝐢𝐭 + 𝟓𝐈𝐧𝐭𝐞𝐫𝐞𝐬𝐭 𝐫𝐚𝐭𝐞𝐢𝐭
+ 
𝟔
𝐄𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐭𝐚𝐱 ∗ 𝐒𝐌𝐄 𝐅𝐢𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐢𝐭
+ 
𝟕
𝐄𝐧𝐯𝐢𝐫𝐨𝐧𝐦𝐞𝐧𝐭𝐚𝐥 𝐭𝐚𝐱 ∗ 𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐢𝐭
+ 
𝟖
𝐆𝐨𝐯𝐞𝐫𝐧𝐚𝐧𝐜𝐞𝐢𝐭 + 𝐘𝐞𝐚𝐫 𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬𝐢 + 𝐂𝐨𝐮𝐧𝐭𝐫𝐲 𝐞𝐟𝐟𝐞𝐜𝐭𝐬𝐢𝐭
+  𝛆𝐢𝐭                                                                                         (2) 
This is where the variable, governance, denotes governance 
indicators, including political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality and control of corruption. 
εitrepresents the disturbance term.  is the vectors of 
coefficient estimates. Table 1 below defines all the variables 
used in this study.  
 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
A. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 presents the study's descriptive statistics. All the 
continuous variables were winsorised at 1% to reduce the 
problem of outliers.  Evidence from Table 2 suggests that as a 
percentage of GDP, OECD countries generate, on average, 7% 
tax revenue from environmental tax with a median and standard 
deviation of 7% and 2%, respectively. The standard deviation 
figure demonstrates a substantial variation in the different 
environmental tax revenues across the sample. Similarly, we 
also find mean innovation across the sample to be 3%, with 
standard deviation and median values of 0.42% and 2.7%, 
respectively. In terms of the SME financing constraint, we find 
that, on average, SMEs get access to about 3% of financial 
resources to enhance their growth opportunities. With respect 
to the control variables, we find the average GDP to be 
approximately £38 billion.  The mean interest rate and inflation 
is 3.8% and 0.2 %, respectively. For the governance indicator 
variables, we find the mean governance effectiveness, political 
stability, regulatory quality, and control of corruption to be 1.4, 
0.87, 1.3 and 1.4, respectively. Appendix 1 also presents a 
country-wide mean distribution of Innovation, Environmental 
Tax, and Financial Constraints for the sample. In Column (1), 
we observe Latvia and Slovenia have the highest share of 
Environmental Taxes 10.08% and 9.95%, respectively and 
Canada with the lowest of 3.72%. Column (4) displays mean 
wide cross-country variation in SME’s innovative activities 
ratio. Switzerland and Luxembourg have the highest innovation 
ratios of 3.33% and 3.07%, respectively, whilst the Slovak 
Republic has the lowest ratio of 2.05%.  In terms of SME 
financing constraints, we observed that SMEs in Netherlands 
and Latvia have the highest access of about 30% and 26%   to 
financial resources to enhance their growth opportunities, 
whilst Canada has the lowest access of about 12%.  
 
Table 1: Variables’ Definition  
Name  Definition Data source 
Innovation   The extent to which national research and development will lead to new commercial 
opportunities is available to SMEs. 





Innovation Rate  
 
The availability of financial resources—equity and debt—for small and medium enterprises 
(SMEs) (including grants and subsidies). 
 
Percentage of those involved in Total early-stage entrepreneurial activity indicates that 
their product or service is new to at least some customers AND that few/no businesses offer 
the same product. 
Global Entrepreneurship Monitor ( 
https://www.gemconsortium.org/data)  
 






A tax whose tax base is a physical unit (or a proxy of it) has a proven specific negative 
impact on the environment. 
 
Represents the total value of constant prices of final goods and services produced within a 









Refer to government bonds maturing in ten years. Rates are mainly determined by the price 




Inflation Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %) https://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/ 
   
Political 
Stability 





























A time-varying indicator variable equals one if either a public registry or a private bureau 
operates in the country, zero otherwise. Information sharing among creditors about clients' 
past (and possibly subsequent) indebtedness helps alleviate the costs of information 
asymmetries, and therefore facilitate lending decisions and promote more lending. 




An index aggregating four powers of secured lenders in bankruptcy. A score of one is 
added to the index when a country's laws and regulations provide each of these powers to 
secured creditors to arrive at the aggregate creditor rights index: (1) whether there are 
restrictions imposed, such as creditors' consent, when a debtor files for reorganization 
(restrictions on reorganization); (2) whether secured creditors have the ability to seize 
collateral after the petition for reorganization is approved (no automatic stay or asset 
freeze); (3) whether secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of proceeds of 
liquidating a bankrupt firm as opposed to other creditors such as employees or government 
(secured creditor paid first);and (4) whether an administrator, rather than the incumbent 
management, is in control of a property pending and responsible for running the business 
during the reorganization (no management stay). The aggregate creditor rights index ranges 
from zero to four, with higher values indicating stronger creditor rights. 
 
 





We categorised countries due to differences in legal origin. Common-law countries give 
both shareholders and creditors more substantial legal rights compared to civil law 
countries. Against this backdrop, we constructed a dummy legal origin 1 for common law 
and any other zero.  
 
Data source: La Porta et al. (1998) 
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B. Pearson Correlation Matrix  
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for the study. 
The findings presented in the table suggest a significantly 
negative correlation between environmental tax and SME 
innovation.  We find the correlations between all the control 
variables below 50%, and, therefore, they indicate no 
multicollinearity concerns. 
 
C. Baseline Regression: Environmental Tax, SME Financing 
Constraint, and Innovation   
The theoretical justification for environmental taxes is that it 
discourages polluting energy, which will increase the use of 
green energy and give rise to the use of innovative approaches. 
The hypotheses are motivated based on this relationship 
contextualising economic (fiscal policy) and SMEs clean 
technology adoption to innovate. Table 4 presents the baseline 
regression results on the relationship between environmental 
tax, financing constraint, and SME innovation to test the 
proposition. Column (1) provides the results of the moderating 
impact of the SME financing constraint on the relationship 
between environmental tax and SME innovation without 
control variables, country, and year effects.  Column (2) reports 
the moderating impact of the SME financing constraint on the 
relationship between environmental tax and SME innovation 
without country and year effects. Column (3) presents the 
relationship between SME financing's moderating impact on 
environmental tax and SME innovation with the relevant 
control variables and controls for variables' year and country 
effects.   
Results from Column (1) of Table 4 reveal that the 
environmental tax's coefficient is negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level (β = -0.0446, t–statistic = -3.05). This 
suggests that an increase in environmental tax costs (Marin et 
al., 2015) constrains SMEs’ innovation. This is consistent with 
earlier studies that suggest firms are less likely to adopt 
technologies or innovation due to the risk of failure (Madrid-
Guijarro et al., 2016). This is more pronounced in the face of 
financing constraints. In line with this, we found the interaction 
term coefficient of Environmental Tax X SME financing 
constraints to be positive and statistically significant. Given the 
influence of the country’s macroeconomic factors on country-
level data, we suspect that the evidence presented in Column 
(1) might be driven by the country’s macroeconomic climate 
and not only by the environmental tax. In view of this, we 
control for, in Column (2) of Table 4, the possibility of 
macroeconomic factors impacting a firm's innovation. 
 
 
Interestingly, we find that each of the coefficients has 
increased in magnitude. We further controlled for the country 
and individual year effects in Column (3). Like Column (2), we 
find that all signs and significance are maintained with a 
relatively increased coefficient magnitude.  In particular, we 
find the interactive term's coefficient (Environmental Tax X 
SME financing constraints) to be positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level (β = 0.120, t–statistic = 2.94), and 
that high environmental tax significantly constrains the 
innovative efforts of financially constrained SMEs. This 
supports our hypothesis that finance constraints positively 
moderate the relationship between environmental tax and 
SMEs’ innovation. The literature corroborates the results 
(Aghion et al., 2012; Brancati, 2015; Hall and Sena, 2017). The 
higher green tax has a negative impact on SMEs innovation, 
similar to the “Schmookler hypothesis” (Jiang et al., 2020). The 
overall evidence from Columns (1), (2) & (4) suggests that 




Table 2: Descriptive Statistics:  
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables under consideration. All variable definitions are contained in Table 1. 
* indicates statistical significance at 5%. 
 Obs Mean Std. Dev. 
perc 10 Median perc 90 
Environmental Tax  480 6.878 1.998 4.391 6.913 9.527 
SME financing constraint 480 2.757 0.417 2.265 2.73 3.300 
 
Innovation Rate 
 480 30.621 8.46 21.52 28.74 44.41 
Innovation 480 2.757 0.417 2.265 2.73   3.300 
GDP 480 38,797 16,851 20,897 36,316 58,070   
Interest Rate 480 3.875 2.504 0.7296   3.895 6.429 
Inflation 480 0.161 0.638 0.010 0.048 0.195 
Political Stability 480 0.87 0.84 0.31 0.130 0.93 
Government Effectiveness 480 1.40 0.53 0.595 1.56 1.150 
Regulatory Quality 480 1.34 0.406 0.59 0.250 1.82 
Control of Corruption 480 1.395 0.75 0.26 1.565 1.310 
Table 3: Correlation Matrix           
This table reports the correlation matrix of the variables under consideration. All variable definitions are contained in Table 1. * indicates statistical 
significance at the 5% 
 Variable  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1 Innovation  1          
2 Environmental Tax 
-
0.2945* 1         
3 SME financing constraint 0.5204* 
-
0.2402* 1        
4 GDP 0.4747* 
-
0.3453* 0.1641* 1       













0.3086* 0.4789* 1     
7 Political Stability 0.3216* 0.0382 0.1752* 0.2855* -0.0524 0.0455 1    
8 Government Effectiveness 0.5609* 
-




0.1783* 0.5480* 1   
9 Regulatory Quality  0.4696* 
-






0.8541*  1  
10 Control of Corruption 0.5394* 
-








0.8666*  1 
 
Table 4: Baseline Regression: SME Financing Constraint, Environmental Tax, and SME Innovation 
This table presents the baseline cross-country panel data fixed effect regression results of model (1) on the 
moderating impact of SME financing constraint on the relationship between environmental tax and SME 
Innovation. Column (1) provides the results of the moderating impact of SME financing constraint on the 
relationship between environmental tax and SME innovation without control variables, country, and year 
effects.  Column (2) reports the moderating impact of SME financing constraint on the relationship between 
environmental tax and SME innovation without country and year effects. Column (3) presents the 
relationship between the moderating impact of SME financing constraint on environmental tax and SME 
innovation with the relevant control variables and controls for variables’ year and country effects.  Time and 
country-level dummies are included in the estimations but not reported. A detailed definition of all the 
variables is in Table 1. T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate 
statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Innovation Innovation Innovation 
Environmental Tax -0.0446*** -0.0378** 
-
0.0442*** 
 (-3.05) (-2.36) (-2.69) 
SME financing constraint 0.674*** 0.638*** 0.648*** 
 (7.08) (6.31) (6.37) 
GDP  0.157*** 0.314*** 
  (3.04) (4.55) 
Interest Rate  0.0121 0.00568 
  (1.74) (0.90) 
Inflation  -0.00262 -0.00522 
  (-0.42) (-0.81) 
Environmental Tax X SME financing 
constraint 0.093 *** 0.101** 0.120** 
 (2.21) (2.53) (2.94) 
Constant  0.110 *** -0.767** 18.44* 
 (2.80) (-0.90) (1.74) 
Year dummy Included No No Yes 
Country dummy Included No No Yes 
N 480 480 480 
R-Squared 0.27 0.39 0.48 
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innovation efforts, its impact tends to be more severe among 
financially constrained SMEs.  The study finds their estimated 
coefficients broadly consistent with prior studies (chu et al., 
2015). For instance, we find a significantly positive relation 
between GDP and innovation in all columns, indicating that 
high economic growth countries innovate more. However, 
interest rates and inflation are insignificant in all columns (see 
columns 1, 2 & 3). 
 
D. Further Analysis: Governance, Environmental Tax, and 
Innovation   
We extend our analysis by exploring the impact of 
governance on the relationship between environmental tax and 
innovation. Several prior literature works have argued that 
countries with good governance invest and peruse innovative 
initiatives to support businesses' growth. Given this, the study 
adopts several governance indicators relevant to estimating the 
impact of an environmental tax on SME innovation, especially 
among OECD countries. The first governance indicator adopted 
for this study is political stability. Existing evidence suggests 
that political instability generates vulnerability that distorts 
institutional and government efforts to develop innovative 
policies to support businesses' growth and survival (Barro, 
1991; Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Cummings et al., 2016). 
According to Barro (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1996), 
government instability, unrest and political violence are 
significantly associated with cross-country differences in 
investment and growth. We argue that the relationship between 
environmental tax and innovation is most likely influenced by 
political stability. 
Table 5 reports the findings on the relationship between 
political, environmental tax and innovation. The overall 
evidence suggests that political stability significantly moderates 
the relationship between environmental tax and innovation 
throughout Columns (1) – (3). Specifically, we find the 
coefficient of the interaction term (Environmental Tax X 
Political stability) is positive and statistically significant at the 
1% level (β = 0.149, t-statistics = 3.33) for Column (3). The 
evidence suggests that governments become more effective in 
managing environmental tax revenues within a stable political 
system to support firms' innovation, especially SMEs.  Our 
findings suggest that a 10% increase in political stability 
accounts for a 15% drop in the firm’s innovation's 
environmental tax impact. The findings suggest that the impact 
of an environmental tax on innovation becomes less severe 
within a politically stable environment. This is consistent with 
current studies (Alesina and Perotti, 1996; Cumminngs, 2016) 
that political stability impacts innovation. Interestingly, we find 
the interactive term's coefficient (Environmental Tax X SME 
financing constraints) positive and statistically significant 
throughout all the columns (see columns 1-3).  This evidence 
supports our initial findings in Column (3) of Table 4 that SME 
financing constraints positively moderate the relationship 
between environmental tax and SME innovation.  
We find the results of the control variables to be similar to 
the previous results of Table 4. 
 
The second governance indicator that the study further 
explored is governance effectiveness. Prior literature reveals 
that government effectiveness in creating and enabling a 
business environment significantly impacts investment 
decisions (Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Billett et al., 2011). 
According to Billett et al. (2011), firms with good governance 
experience attract and effectively manage significant 
investments. This is evident from Giroud and Mueller’s 2010 
findings that poor governance contributes to the 
underinvestment of firms. Several prior shreds of evidence 
suggest that government effectiveness matters in countries' 
innovative efforts (Becker-Blease, 2011 Sapra et al., 2015). The 
overall evidence suggests that countries that maintain effective 
governments become more successful in pursuing effective, 
innovative policies towards supporting firms' growth and 
survival. Building on these findings, we argue that government 
effectiveness most likely influences the relationship between 
environmental tax and innovation.  
Table 6 reports the findings on the relationship between 
government effectiveness, environmental tax and innovation. 
Evidence from Table 6 reveals that government effectiveness 
positively moderates the relationship between environmental 
tax and innovation in Columns (1), (2) & (3). This is consistent 
with previous estimations. Consistent with our expectations, we 
also find the coefficient of the interaction term (Environmental 
Tax X SME financing constraints) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level (β = 0.432, t-statistics = 2.92) for 
Column (3). This confirms our previous findings that SME 
financing constraints positively moderate the relationship 
between environmental tax and innovation. 
Table 5: Political Instability, Environmental Tax and SME Innovation 
This table reports a cross-country panel data fixed effect regression results of model (2) on the impact of 
political instability on the relationship between SME financing constraint, environmental tax and SME 
Innovation. Column (1) provides the results of the impact of political instability on the relationship between 
SME financing constraint, environmental tax and SME Innovation without control variables, country, and year 
effects.  Column (2) reports the relationship without for country and year effects. Column (3) presents the 
relationship with the relevant control variables and controls for variables’ year and country effects.  Time and 
country-level dummies are included in the estimations but not reported. A detailed definition of all the variables 
is in Table 1. T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Innovation Innovation Innovation 
Environmental Tax -0.0983*** -0.0469*** -0.0475*** 
 (-4.64) (-2.93) (-2.96) 
Political Stability  -0.0513** -0.0260 -0.0362* 
 (-2.39) (-1.28) (-1.69) 
SME financing constraint  0.685*** 0.672*** 
  (6.89) (6.84) 
GDP  0.154*** 0.277*** 
  (2.92) (3.79) 
Interest Rate  0.00870 0.00301 
  (1.33) (0.45) 
Inflation  -0.00104 -0.00275 
  (-0.17) (-0.43) 
Environmental Tax X SME financing constraint 0.392** 0.307** 0.334** 
 (2.36) (2.12) (2.31) 
Environmental Tax X Political stability 0.0491*** 0.140*** 0.149*** 
 (8.20) (3.21) (3.33) 
Constant   2.34 *** -1.10** 15.84* 
 (15.62) (-1.33) (1.19) 
Year dummy Included No No Yes 
Country dummy Included No No Yes 
N 480 480 480 





The third most crucial governance indicator, which 
significantly impacts the relationship between environmental 
tax and innovation, is regulatory quality. For the extent that the 
prior evidence shows that regulatory quality significantly 
impacts governments’ innovation outcomes see Zhuge et al. 
(2020). Against this backdrop, we expect the regulatory quality 
to significantly moderate the relationship between 
environmental tax and innovation. Table 7 presents the 
empirical results on a regulatory quality's role in the 
relationship between environmental tax and innovation. The 
evidence from Table 7 suggests that regulatory quality has an 
insignificant relationship between environmental tax, 
regulatory quality and innovation throughout all the columns of 
Table 7. On the other hand, we find the coefficient of the 
interaction term (Environmental Tax X SME financing 
constraints) to be positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level (β = 0.368, t-statistics = 2.70) for Column (3), thus 
confirming our previous findings that are presented in Table 4. 
 
 
Finally, we explore the implication of corruption on the 
relationship between environmental tax and innovation. We 
build our argument on the premise that the pace and extent of 
innovative activities tend to be affected by corruption 
(Wellalage et al., 2020). For example, corrupt governments 
may distort innovative policies because corrupt politicians (or 
corrupt public officers) may be expected to use their authority 
on those activities. It is easier to collect bribes (see Hwang, 
2002). In view of this, we investigate the empirical link between 
control of corruption, environmental tax and innovation. 
Evidence of this relationship is presented in Table 8. Evidence 
from Table 8 shows an insignificant relationship between 
control of corruption, environmental tax and innovation 
throughout all the columns of Table 8. Similar to the rest of the 
estimation presented, we find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term (Environmental Tax X SME financing 
constraints) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% 
level (β = 0.113, t-statistics = 2.60) for Column (3). This 
confirms our previous findings that SME financing constraints 




V. ADDITIONAL RESULTS AND ROBUSTNESS 
CHECKS 
This section conducts a series of tests to determine our 
analysis's sensitivity after controlling for endogeneity and 
alternative measures of the relevant variables, subsamples, and 
periods. 
A. Endogeneity Concerns 
We predict a fundamental problem on the relationship 
between environmental tax, financing constraint, and SMEs 
innovation is endogeneity. This could be explained by the fact 
that the amount and type of environmental tax and financial 
constraints in the sample countries are not exogenous and thus 
a key potential source of endogeneity. For instance, the level of 
both green and non-green product innovation may very well 
determine environmental tax, implying that causality might 
occur in the reverse direction. Given this, the study adopts 
several steps in addressing the above issues of causality and 
endogeneity associated with the study.   
Table 6: Governance Effectiveness, Environmental Tax and SME Innovation 
This table presents a cross-country panel data fixed effect regression results of model (2) on the 
implications of governance effectiveness on the relationship between SME financing constraint, 
environmental tax and SME Innovation.  Column (1) presents the results without control variables, 
country, and year effects.   Column (2) reports the relationship without for country and year effects. 
Column (3) presents the relationship with the relevant control variables and controls for variables’ year 
and country effects.  Time and country-level dummies are included in the estimations but not reported. 
A detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom are 
in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Innovation Innovation Innovation 
Environmental Tax -0.0831*** -0.0370** -0.0423** 
 (-4.63) (-1.98) (-2.09) 
Governance effectiveness -0.0333 -0.0307* -0.0309* 
 (-1.31) (-1.76) (-1.76) 
SME financing constraint  0.560*** 0.554*** 
  (5.19) (5.10) 
GDP  0.118** 0.215** 
  (2.32) (2.39) 
Interest Rate  0.00822 0.00521 
  (1.31) (0.84) 
Inflation  -0.00219 -0.00349 
  (-0.36) (-0.56) 
Environmental Tax X SME financing 
constraint 0.772*** 0.441*** 0.432*** 
 (5.37) (3.01) (2.92) 
Governance effectiveness X Environmental 
Tax 0.0475*** 0.119*** 0.127*** 
 (8.06) (2.75) (2.84) 
Constant  2.34 *** -1.10** 15.84* 
 (15.62) (-1.33) (1.19) 
Year dummy Included No No Yes 
Country dummy Included No No Yes 
N 480 480 480 
R-Squared 0.40 0.47 0.49 
 
Table 7: Regulatory Quality, Environmental Tax and SME Innovation  
This table reports the results of a cross-country panel data fixed effect regression results of model (2) on the 
effect of regulatory quality on the relationship between SME financing constraint, environmental tax and 
SME Innovation.  Column (1) presents the results without control variables, country, and year effects. 
Column (2) reports the relationship without for country and year effects. Column (3) presents the relationship 
with the relevant control variables and controls for variables’ year and country effects.  Time and country-
level dummies are included in the estimations but not reported. A detailed definition of all the variables is in 
Table 1. T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Innovation Innovation Innovation 
Environmental Tax 0.113*** -0.0422** -0.0786*** 
 (2.60) (-2.30) (-3.33) 
Regulatory quality  -0.0423** -0.0408 -0.0106 
 (-2.31) (-0.27) (-0.07) 
SME financing constraint  0.661*** 0.639*** 
  (5.77) (5.63) 
GDP  0.146*** 0.333*** 
  (2.70) (3.80) 
Interest Rate  0.0111 0.00455 
  (1.60) (0.71) 
Inflation  -0.00321 -0.00443 
  (-0.49) (-0.68) 
Environmental Tax X Regulatory quality  -0.00623 0.00902 -0.0515 
  (-0.30) (0.48) (-3.07) 
Environmental Tax X SME financing constraint 0.0500*** 0.0941** 0.368*** 
 (8.39) (2.25) (2.70) 
Constant   2.19*** -0.65** 20.76* 
 (8.10) (-0.81) (1.52) 
Year dummy Included No No Yes 
Country dummy Included No No Yes 
N 480 480 480 
R-Squared 0.26 0.40 0.47 
 
Table 8: Control of Corruption, Environmental Tax, and SME Innovation 
This table reports results of a cross-country panel data fixed effect regression results of model (2) on the effect of control of 
corruption on the relationship between SME financing constraint, environmental tax and SME Innovation. Column (1) presents the 
results without control variables, country, and year effects.  Column (2) reports the relationship without for country and year effects. 
Column (3) presents the relationship with the relevant control variables and controls for variables’ year and country effects.  Time 
and country-level dummies are included in the estimations but not reported. A detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. 
T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Innovation Innovation Innovation 
Environmental Tax -0.0788*** -0.0334* -0.0338* 
 (-3.97) (-1.91) (-1.93) 
Control of Corruption 0.455*** 0.252** 0.239** 
 (4.70) (2.38) (2.24) 
SME financing constraint  0.590*** 0.579*** 
  (5.43) (5.33) 
GDP  0.0959* 0.244*** 
  (1.80) (2.80) 
Interest Rate  0.00852 0.00468 
  (1.34) (0.75) 
Inflation  -0.00449 -0.00534 
  (-0.74) (-0.86) 
Environmental Tax X Control of Corruption -0.0474*** -0.0190 -0.0252 
 (-3.92) (-1.44) (-1.72) 
Environmental Tax X SME financing constraint 0.0478*** 0.104** 0.113*** 
 (8.06) (2.46) (2.60) 
Constant  2.06*** -0.30** 15.79* 
 (11.43) (-0.38) (1.10) 
Year dummy Included No No Yes 
Country dummy Included No No Yes 
N 480 480 480 
R-Squared 0.39 0.46 0.49 
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B. Dynamic Activity of Innovation and Its Non-linearity  
Existing evidence suggests that innovation is a dynamic 
activity, given that knowledge acquired from previous SME 
innovation is used in the current innovation procedure (Dziallas 
and Blind, 2019; Kneller and Manderson, 2012). Moreover, 
R&D spending in the current year cannot reflect the innovation 
(process and product) of the same year. Against this backdrop, 
the study adopts a dynamic panel regression to mitigate further 
endogeneity issues. In order to achieve this, we adopt lag values 
of all the variables used for the study, including the dependent 
variable (innovation) and the independent variable 
(Environmental Tax). Evidence from dynamic panel regression 
is presented in Panel B of Table 9. The econometric regressions 
and control variables are the same as in Table 4. The results are 
consistent with the baseline results presented in Table 4 and 
show a statistically significant relationship between innovation 
and environmental tax. Consistent with our predictions, we find 
that the lag value of SME innovation (dependent variable) 
significantly impacts the current year’s innovation. Therefore, 
the evidence suggests that knowledge acquired from previous 
innovation is significantly relevant for a country’s current 
year’s innovation strategy of SMEs (Dziallas and Blind, 2019; 
Azar and Ciabuschi, 2017).    
To further strengthen the results, we also captured the non-
linear relationship between SME innovation and environmental 
tax. This is because R&D expenditure normalised by GDP may 
vary from country to country depending on unobserved 
country-level factors, which may cause the relationship 
between SME innovation and an environmental tax to be non-
linear. Because of this, we adopt a squared term of 
environmental tax in the regression model to capture the non-
linear relationship between SME innovation and environmental 
tax. Panel A of Table 9 presents the key findings of the non-
linear relationship between SME innovation and environmental 
tax. Evidence from Table 9 finds the significant negative 
relationship between the squared term of environmental tax and 
SME innovation. We also find a significantly positive 
relationship between environmental tax and SME innovation. 
The overall evidence clarifies that the negative impact of an 
environmental tax on innovation has a short-term effect on a 
country’s innovation. In the long term, the impact of an 
environmental tax on SME innovation tends to be beneficial to 
countries. This is consistent with the evidence presented by 
(Bitencourt et al., 2020). According to Bitencourt et al. (2020), 
regulatory instruments have significant antecedents to green 
innovation, further underscoring the importance of 
understanding the relationship between green tax regulations 
and innovation, as argued in this paper.    
 
C. Two-Stage Least Square  
Even though the extensive use of sets of control variables and 
the use of lagged independent variables may reduce reverse 
causality issues, the study believes issues of reverse causality 
and endogeneity may not be fully resolved. Therefore, to further 
address the endogeneity concerns, we conduct an instrumental 
variable analysis as an identification strategy to tackle the fear 
that environmental tax and innovation could be exogenous in 
establishing the quality and type of innovation. Following Lei 
et al. (2018), we employed a two-stage least square procedure 
using three country-level instruments to encapsulate the 
different country-level aspects of the amount and type of 
environmental tax. These instruments include Information 
Sharing, Legal Origin and Creditors Rights. In the study, we 
examine closely the validity of the IVs used for the study’s IV 
estimations. For the variables to be classified as a valid 
instrument, they ought to have been both exogenous 
(uncorrelated with the regression residuals) and relevant (highly 
correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable) for the 
study. Instrument relevance is confirmed by first-stage 
regressions (untabulated for brevity). Instrument relevance is 
further established by Angrist-Pischke's weak identification test 
and Cragg-Doland statistics. Hansen’s overidentification test 
has a joint null hypothesis of proper IVs (relevance and 
exogeneity).  The validity of IVs is substantiated by the fact that 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis at a conventional level of 
significance. We also found both the Durbin (score) Chi-Square 
and Wu-Hausman F statistic test for endogeneity, suggesting 
the 2SLS approach is appropriate with the relevant instruments 
given the endogeneity problem.  
Aside from these tests of the validity of the instruments, the 
study also suggests that these three instrumental variables are 
exogenous (uncorrelated with the regression residuals) and 
relevant (highly correlated with the endogenous explanatory 
variable) to country-level other variables in the models. For 
instance, Legal Origin, Creditor Rights, and Information 
Sharing are significantly related to SME finance and credit. 
Several prior studies (Bhattacharya and Daouk, 2002; Qian and 
Strahan, 2007) have suggested that countries with strong 
creditor rights protect lenders from agency costs and facilitate 
repossession of collateral in default. According to Mann (2015), 
elevated creditor rights promote the use of patents, an essential 
intangible asset used as collateral to lessen covenants on loans 
and borrowings. We expect the overall benefit of more 
substantial creditor rights to be disproportionately higher 
 
Table 9: SME Financing Constraint, Environmental Tax, and SME Innovation using Non-linear relationship and Dynamic Model 
This table presents a cross-country panel data fixed effect regression results of model (1) on the impact of SME financing constraint on the relationship between environmental tax and SME 
Innovation using a non-linear and dynamic model estimation. Panel A provides the results of a non-linear relationship of SME financing constraint on the relationship between environmental tax 
and SME innovation. We took the square of environmental tax to capture its non-linear term.   Panel B reports the dynamic panel results of SME financing constraint on the relationship between 
environmental tax and SME innovation. We lagged of both the dependent and independent variables in the dynamic model of panel B.  All control variables, time and country-level dummies are 
included in the estimations but not reported. A detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  


















     
0.581*** 0.575*** 0.564*** 0.584*** 0.568***       
(12.19) (11.80) (11.66) (12.41) (11.82) 
Environmental Tax Squared -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.00922*** -0.0069*** -0.009***  
    
 
(-2.83) (-2.89) (-4.02) (-2.85) (-3.97)  
    
Environmental Tax 0.181** 0.209*** 0.274*** 0.197*** 0.251*** -0.049*** -0.017*** -0.0161*** -0.0119*** -0.0186***  
(2.57) (3.06) (3.67) (2.61) (3.58) (-3.27) (-5.72) (-4.59) (-3.31) (-5.47) 
SME financing constraint -0.0379** -0.0421** -0.0228 -0.0246 -0.0262 -0.0818** -0.0282** -0.0223* -0.0286** -0.0248**  
(-2.14) (-2.50) (-1.32) (-1.32) (-1.58) (-2.10) (-2.39) (-1.80) (-2.09) (-2.09) 
Environmental Tax X SME 
financing constraint 
0.575*** 0.604*** 0.460*** 0.503*** 0.499*** 0.017*** 0.213*** 0.176*** 0.189*** 0.174*** 
 
(5.00) (5.59) (4.18) (4.25) (4.72)  (5.20) (3.85) (4.17) (3.76) 
Governance Indicator  
 
0.261** 0.550*** 0.164 0.348***  0.0562 0.176* 0.154* 0.103   
(2.46) (4.05) (1.08) (3.87)  (0.62) (1.86) (1.70) (1.62) 
Environmental Tax X 
Governance Indicator 
 
0.0277* 0.0601*** 0.0274 0.0403***  0.00338 0.0146 0.00105 0.00811 
  
(1.74) (3.41) (1.40) (3.44)  (0.26) (1.20) (0.08) (1.00) 
Constant  29.53*** 27.82*** 19.58*** 32.35*** 25.83*** 5.890 7.506 4.057 5.760 5.608  
(4.99) (4.04) (2.80) (4.86) (3.84) (1.18) (1.24) (0.67) (0.97) (0.94) 
Control Variables Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 480 480 480 480 480 456 456 456 456 456 
R-Squared 0.51 0.52 0.54 0.52 0.54 0.63 0.64 0.63 0.64 0.63 
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among innovative firms at the country level.   
Similarly, legal origin impacts the level of investment. La 
Porta et al. (1998) also argues that laws vary a lot across 
countries because of differences in legal origin, which affects 
the level of protection on the investments for both shareholders 
and creditors. According to the authors, common law countries 
give both creditors and shareholders better protection and legal 
rights compared to civil law countries. This form of protection 
is relevant in securing and protecting the firm’s investment in 
innovation, especially patent and R&D investment. Information 
sharing has been argued to significantly affect access to and the 
cost of credit (See Behr and Sonnekalb 2012). Similarly, 
Kamaşak and Bulutlar  (2010) demonstrate the effects of 
information sharing on innovation. Evidence from the study 
suggests that knowledge collecting had a significant effect on 
all types of innovation and ambidexterity.  
The findings of our first stage regression are presented in 
Panel A of Table 10. In each of the results presented in Table 
10, we regressed environmental tax on our instrumental 
variables: Information Sharing, Legal Origin and Creditors 
Rights and all the control variables used in Equation (2). In the 
second stage, we used the predicted probability from the first 
stage regression to represent the environmental tax variable as 
the primary independent variable in Equation (2). Results of the 
second stage estimations are presented in Panel B of Table 10. 
The results confirm our previous evidence that financial 
constraint moderates the relationship between environmental 
tax and SME innovation. The result, however, implies that 
financial constraint remains relevant for a country’s 




D. The Sensitivity of Crisis Period  
We further explored our analysis' sensitivity to the financial 
crisis. Our premise is influenced by Duchin et al. (2010), 
suggesting that during the 2008 financial crisis, firms relied 
heavily on excess cash to finance their investment, including 
innovation. As a result, the effect of environmental tax and 
financial constraints on SME innovation may be unique to the 
crisis periods.  To investigate this possibility, we divide our 
sample into crisis and non-crisis periods. We identified 2007, 
2008, and 2009 as crisis years and presented the results in Table 
11. A dummy variable is a proxy for crisis 1 for the crisis 
periods (2007, 2008, and 2009) and 0 for any other years. 
  Panel A presents the interactive effects of financial constraint 
and environmental tax on countries’ innovation during financial 
crisis periods. The evidence throughout the Panel A of Table 11 
supports our previous evidence that financial constraint and 
environmental tax positively affect SME innovation during the 
financial crisis. Therefore, it can be deduced that environmental 
tax negatively impacts SME innovation during the financial 
crisis due to the financial constraint countries tend to face 
during such periods. Consistent with Autry et al. (2010), 
investments in innovation and related technologies may not be 
advisable in such a turbulent environment.   
E. Propensity Score Matching 
Countries are intrinsically different in many aspects, which, in 
addition to financial constraint, may also influence the 
relationship between environmental tax and SME innovation. 
For instance, the sample's amount and type of environmental 
tax and financial constraints are not likely to be exogenous. 
Potentially, the evidence could be embedded in the quality and 
type of innovation. The results so far do not tell us whether the 
impact of an environmental tax on SME innovation is likely to 
vary based on the level of SME innovation (high versus low 
innovation countries).  Thus, are countries with high-level SME 
innovation demonstrate slightly less environmental tax SME 
innovation outcomes on average?  However, given that our data 
is observational, countries are not randomly assigned to be high 
or low innovation countries. We split our sample into two high 
and low innovations for a better comparison based on the 
corresponding annual median following Lei et al. (2018). We 
created a dummy level of innovation, 1 for high innovation 
countries, i.e. countries with annual R&D per GDP values 
higher than the corresponding annual median and low countries 
for those below the corresponding annual median. We 
considered high innovation countries as our treatment group 
and low innovation countries as the control group.   
In order to enhance covariate balance between the two 
groups, we need to ascertain the overlap assumption is satisfied, 
i.e. whether there is a chance of seeing observations in both the 
control and treatment groups. To achieve this, Maffioli et al. 
(2009) suggest the need to run t-tests of equality of means 
before and after the matching to evaluate if the PSM succeeds 
in balancing the characteristics between treated and untreated 
groups. In view of this, the study adopts a calliper of 0.1 to 
estimate the absolute difference in propensity scores between 
treated and untreated groups. A calliper of 0.1 denotes a match 
for each pair of observations with an absolute difference in 
propensity scores less than 0.1. The overlap balance graphical 
plots in Fig 2 demonstrate evidence of overlap of propensity 
scores between the treated and the control group of the sample 
with a high level of common support, demonstrating that the 
overlap assumption is satisfied. 
 
Table 10:  SME financing constraint, Environmental tax, and SME Innovation using two-stage least square estimation:  
This table presents the relationship between SME financing constraint, Environmental tax, and SME Innovation using two-stage least square (2SLS) estimations.  Panel A report the first-stage estimations on 
the effect of SME financing constraint, Environmental tax, and SME innovation. Panel B present the second-stage estimations.  The study adopts Information Sharing, Legal Origin and Creditors Rights as 
key instruments for the instrumental variable regressions.  A detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. A year and industry dummies are included in the estimations but not reported. T statistic is in 
brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Instrument relevance is further established by Angrist-Pischke's weak identification test and Cragg-Doland 
statistics. Hansen’s overidentification test, which has a joint null hypothesis of proper IVs (relevance and exogeneity), is also presented in the table.  

















Corruption            
Environmental Tax -0.682 -0.754 -0.774* -0.914* -1.110 -0.159*** -0.155*** -0.0881*** -0.149*** -0.110*** 
 
(-0.90) (-1.54) (-1.82) (-1.76) (-1.62) (-6.66) (-8.00) (-3.10) (-5.69) (-5.40) 
Environmental Tax 0.420*** 0.417*** 0.403*** 0.528*** 0.478*** 0.0499*** 0.0498*** 0.0470*** 0.0525*** 0.0491*** 
 
(2.87) (6.65) (6.45) (8.16) (6.48) (5.67) (8.89) (8.30) (9.08) (8.69) 
SME financing constraint -1.137 -1.229 -1.443 -1.701 -2.224 0 0 0 0 0 
 
(-0.69) (-1.21) (-1.56) (-1.44) (-1.43) . . . . . 
GDP 0.229 0.241 0.276* 0.324* 0.403* 0.487*** 0.458*** 0.431*** 0.541*** 0.455*** 
 
(0.89) (1.52) (1.90) (1.73) (1.65) (5.43) (10.75) (9.10) (11.51) (9.62) 
Interest Rate 0.0501 0.0565* 0.0552** 0.0567** 0.0702* 0.0206** 0.0205*** 0.0181*** 0.0176*** 0.0172*** 
 
(1.03) (1.84) (2.24) (2.05) (1.88) (2.10) (3.60) (3.23) (3.07) (3.18) 
Inflation -0.0309 -0.0342** -0.0325** -0.0334** -0.0403** -0.0171* -0.0179*** -0.0138** -0.0155** -0.0155** 
 
(-1.50) (-2.23) (-2.33) (-2.27) (-2.03) (-1.96) (-2.64) (-2.16) (-2.30) (-2.45) 
Governance Indicator  
 
-0.295 -0.0313 -0.0306 -0.0536** 
 
0.107 -0.0417*** -0.0113 -0.0316*** 
  
(-0.85) (-1.32) (-0.92) (-2.19) 
 
(0.96) (-2.66) (-0.73) (-3.25) 
Environmental Tax X 
Governance Indicator 
 
0.0423 0.237 0.0213 0.318** 
 
-0.00830 0.379*** 0.00575 0.260*** 
  
(0.92) (1.29) (0.10) (2.20) 
 
(-0.49) (3.15) (0.04) (3.38) 
Constant  22.44 18.21* 21.53** 32.93*** 31.25*** 29.67*** 27.16*** 25.07*** 35.01*** 30.34*** 
 
(1.38) (1.76) (2.52) (3.76) (3.34) (2.96) (4.00) (3.69) (5.38) (4.58) 
N 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 480 
Year dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Angrist-Pischke χ2-statistic p-
value (underidentification) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic p-
value (weak identification) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000      
Hansen J-statistic p-value 
(overidentification) 
0.202 0.146 0.133 0.158 0.187      
Cragg–Doland Wald F 
Stat  
46.62 299.57 334.43 244.28 243.87      
R-Squared 0.16 0.10 0.07 0.12 0.11 0.50 0.52 0.53 0.51 0.53 
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Fig 2: Graphical Balance Plot 
 
In order to further determine the covariate balance of the 
sample, we conducted a formal balancing test, with the 
evidence presented in Table 11A. Evidence from the Table 
suggests a substantial reduction of the absolute values of 
standardised percentage biases for all the covariates. All the 
absolute standardised percentage biases after matching are 
reduced to less than 10. Before matching, we find the mean and 
median absolute standardised percentage biases for all the 
covariates to be 15.9 and 2.2, respectively. However, after the 
matching, both the mean and median absolute standardised 
percentage biases drop dramatically to 1 and 1.2. We also find 
the likelihood ratio (LR) tests for all the covariates to be jointly 
significant both before and after matching. Further, we matched 
one-to-one all the selected variables to the nearest 
neighbourhood (NNM) without replacement and match firms 
with similar scores in the study.  
Using the level of innovation dummy as the dependent 
variable, we deploy a probit model for estimating the propensity 
scores, including all the control variables used in our previous 
estimations. The test shows that the propensity score-matched 
samples of high innovation countries (treated) firms are broadly 
similar to low innovation countries (control) firms. The results 
from the propensity score matching are presented in Panel B of 
Table 11B. The econometric regressions and control variables 
are the same as in Table 4. The results are consistent with the 
baseline results presented in Table 4 and show statistically 
significant differences in the level of SME innovation between 
propensity score-matched (comparable) High and Low 
innovation countries. In all estimations, common probability 
support of the treated and control units is enforced to ensure 
better comparability of matched units. The overall evidence 
suggests a complete fulfilment of the overall balancing 
condition for each outcome. Overall, the propensity score 
process appears to remove obvious sample selection biases and 





F. Alternative Measure of Innovation 
We adopt the country innovation rate as an alternative 
measure of our dependent variable to further enhance our 
results' robustness. Following (Kelley et al., 2012), our measure 
of innovation was replaced with the innovation rate. Innovation 
rate measures the percentage of firms involved in total early-
stage entrepreneurial activity, which indicate that their product 
or service is new to at least some customers and that few/no 
businesses offer the same product (Kelley et al., 2012; Rusu and 
Dornean, 2019). A high innovation rate score reflects a high rate 
of innovation for a country. In light of this, we further rerun our 
estimation using innovation rate as an alternative measure of 
innovation to determine our analysis's sensitivity to an 
alternative measure of innovation.  However, we align the 
empirical analysis with the model by repeating the model's 
predictions of the impact of an environmental tax on our new 
measurement of innovation (innovation rate) to avoid any 
disconnections between the theoretical definition of normalised 
innovation its accepted empirical counterpart.  
The results are presented in Table 12. Column (1) shows the 
relationship between environmental tax, SME financing 
constraints and innovation rate. Columns (2) - (4) report on the 
implications of the various governance indicators (political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality and 
control of corruption) on the relationship between 
environmental tax and innovation rate, respectively. The results 
throughout the columns remain substantial and statistically 
significant, as previously established. In particular, we find the 
coefficient of the interaction term (Environmental Tax X SME 
financing constraints) positive and statistically significant as 
previously established. Overall, the evidence presented in Table 
12 suggests that all our new innovation measures positively and 
significantly moderate the relation between environmental tax 
and innovation rate. 
 
  
Table 11A: Balancing Test: 
This table presents the balancing test results for the propensity score matching for the study. |% Bias| denotes the absolute value of standardised percentage bias, which is the 
% difference of the sample means in the treated and non-treated (full or matched) sub-samples as a percentage of the square root of the average sample variances in the treated 
and non-treated groups. The last two rows report the likelihood ratio (LR) test for the joint insignificance of all the regressors, along with the p-values in parentheses.*, **, 




  After Matching 
  
 
Treated Control |%Bias| Treated Control |%Bias| 
Environmental Tax 6.4121 6.230 44.6*** 6.4121 5.5641 0.49* 
GDP 10.647 10.308 2.1 10.647 10.639 1.20 
Interest Rate 3.2271 4.30 -0.6  3.2271 3.2405 1.25 
Inflation 1.8764 2.151 1.5 1.8764 1.8451 1.23 
SME financing constraint 2.8985 2.890 2.3 2.8985 2.8899 1.28 
Environmental Tax X SME financing constraint 18.54 17.875 44.3*** 18.54 16.023 0.53* 
Mean|%Bias|   15.9   1.00 
Median|%Bias|   2.2   1.22 
LR Test   215.35***   22.54*** 
 
Table 11B: SME Financing Constraint, Environmental Tax, and SME Innovation using Financial Crisis and Propensity Score Matching 
This table presents the fixed effect regression and propensity score matching results of the financial crisis effect on the impact of SME financing constraint on the relationship between environmental 
tax and SME Innovation. Panel A provides the results of the financial crisis effect on the impact of SME financing constraint on the relationship between environmental tax and SME innovation. A 
dummy variable is a proxy for crisis 1 for the crisis periods (1991, 2001, 2007, 2008, and 2009) and 0 for any other years.  Panel B reports the propensity score matching results of SME financing 
constraint on the relationship between environmental tax and SME innovation using a  probit model.  ATT is the Average Treatment effect on the Treated using the Nearest neighbour matching. Note 
that all standard errors refer to bootstrapped standard errors (the analytical ones do not differ much and are rather underestimated). # treated (# untreated) is the number of treated (control) units. All 
control variables, time and country-level dummies are included in the estimations but not reported. A detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom 
are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  















Environmental Tax -0.0986** -0.0820* -0.0920** -0.0985** -0.0902** -0.0646** -
0.038*** 
-0.0328*** -0.037*** -0.00841** 
 
(-2.09) (-1.75) (-1.99) (-1.98) (-2.01) (-2.49) (-3.05) (-2.73) (-3.06) (-2.09) 
Environmental Tax X SME 
financing constraint 
0.656*** 0.605*** 0.567*** 0.703*** 0.560*** 0.209*** 0.447*** 0.289* 0.455*** 0.368** 
 
(11.23) (9.15) (7.97) (10.53) (7.40) (2.73) (4.50) (1.81) (3.62) (2.44) 
SME financing constraint 0.0637 0.103 0.0812 0.106 0.0630 0.366*** 0.654*** 0.568** 0.686*** 0.571***  
(0.49) (0.84) (0.57) (0.70) (0.49) (4.94) (3.21) (2.57) (2.90) (2.69) 
Governance Indicator  
 
0.0669 0.0359 -0.135 -0.00494 
 
-0.0425 -0.0343 -0.134 -0.0279   
(0.53) (0.26) (-1.02) (-0.00) 
 
(-1.40) (-0.93) (-0.43) (-1.11) 
Environmental Tax X 
Governance Indicator 
 
0.00463 0.0106 0.0109 0.0646 
 
0.358* 0.438 0.0166 0.265 
  
(0.26) (0.57) (0.67) (0.78) 
 
(1.78) (1.59) (0.39) (1.41) 
Constant  24.86* 15.50 8.604 29.40** 12.76 17.55*** 11.96 -3.389 10.46 7.686  
(1.87) (1.06) (0.56) (2.06) (0.86) (2.68) (0.77) (-0.20) (0.69) (0.46) 
Control Variables Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 216 216 216 216 216 478 478 478 478 478 
R-Squared 0.57 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.58 0.56 0.67 0.64 0.66 0.65 
ATT (Nearest Neighbour)      2.912***     
Std. err.      0.029     
# treated       2.923     
# control        2.317     
Std. err.      0.0197     
 
Table 12: Robustness Test:  Alternative measure of Innovation 
This table reports a cross-country panel data fixed effect regression results of model (1) on the relationship between SME financing constraint, environmental tax and SME 
Innovation using innovation rate as an alternative measure of Innovation. A detailed definition of all the variables is in Table 1. T statistic is in brackets. Degrees of freedom 
are in brackets. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Innovation  Political Stability Government Effectiveness Regulatory Quality Control of Corruption 
Environmental Tax 1.336* 1.196* 1.111 1.319* 1.284* 
 (1.92) (1.66) (1.61) (1.89) (1.83) 
SME financing constraint 2.599* 3.486** 3.496** 2.828 2.940* 
 (1.77) (2.36) (2.11) (1.62) (1.83) 
GDP 0.790 0.271 -0.535 0.256 -1.417 
 (0.40) (0.13) (-0.25) (0.12) (-0.61) 
Interest Rate -0.112 -0.0178 -0.0754 -0.0791 -0.0872 
 (-0.89) (-0.14) (-0.60) (-0.61) (-0.68) 
Inflation 0.00864 -0.00580 0.0179 -0.0166 -0.0125 
 (0.07) (-0.05) (0.15) (-0.14) (-0.10) 
Governance Indicator   -3.586 -1.471 1.114 1.088 
  (-1.47) (-0.52) (0.39) (0.63) 
Environmental Tax X SME financing 
constraint 0.781*** 0.468*** 0.396** 0.715** 0.67** 
 (0.31) (1.23) (0.91) (0.19) (1.52) 
Environmental Tax X Governance Indicator  0.779** 0.467 0.128 0.170 
  (2.34) (1.37) (0.34) (0.78) 
Constant 19.44* 14.84* 15.74* 21.76* 15.80* 
 (1.94) (1.18) (1.10) (1.62) (1.20) 
Year dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country dummy Included Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 480 480 480 480 480 
R-Squared 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.13 
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Environmental taxes, theoretically, are imposed to influence 
behaviour change in firms to mitigate adverse environmental 
outcomes. Thus, encouraging green innovation. Within this 
context, SMEs’ innovation is critical for all economies to 
develop a technology that will help reduce carbon emission to 
better the environment. The paper contributes to the literature. 
It empirically demonstrates the extent to which taxes are used 
to discourage firms from polluting the environment. To 
measure the effectiveness of environmental taxes, the paper 
uses data from OECD countries and tests the effect of green tax 
on SMEs’ capability to innovate and discontinue polluting 
technologies. Summary of the key findings shows that (a) 
environmental taxes negatively impact SMEs ability to 
innovate, (b) financing constraint moderates the relationship 
between environmental tax and SMEs innovation, (c) financial 
constraint and environmental tax positively affect SME 
innovation during the financial crisis due to the financial 
constraint countries tend to face in such periods.  
SMEs encounter a finance constraint that tends to affect their 
investment strategy at large and, most specifically, their ability 
to innovate and use environmentally friendly technologies. 
Internally generated working capital is insufficient to invest in 
clean technologies (Kenney et al., 2020; da Silva et al., 2017). 
Thus, to encourage investment in clean technologies, SMEs 
rely on external finance. However, external finance for 
innovation and the adoption of clean technology are not easily 
accessible due to its high risk, limiting SMEs’ ability to 
innovate. The analysis suggests that SMEs have a financial gap 
that limits their ability to innovate technologies that reduce 
carbon emission, and environmental taxes exacerbate these 
outcomes.  Due to the existence of a finance gap, instead of 
innovating and embedding technologies, SMEs merely comply 
with environmental regulations to avoid paying environmental 
taxes. These findings suggest that a financing constraint will 
positively affect the relationship between environmental tax 
and SMEs’ innovation to reduce carbon emission.   
Finance is a resource required for innovation, and 
environmental taxes are a cost that increases the cost of 
innovation; this generates a vicious cycle that negates the 
purpose of using environmental taxes to encourage SMEs to 
replace polluting technologies. This suggests that fiscal 
policies, such as green taxes, are insufficient to persuade SMEs 
to bring about a change to their behaviour. There is, therefore, 
a case for government intervention to finance SMEs’ 
innovation through a financial stimulus to promote eco-
innovation (Cecere et al., 2020).  
Results reported in Table 4 question the environmental tax 
policy used to encourage SMEs to innovate and adopt green 
technologies. The results indicate that the environmental tax's 
coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the 1% 
level. This suggests that an increase in environmental tax 
constrains SMEs’ innovation. The findings also reveal that the 
interaction term coefficient of environmental tax and SME 
financing constraints is positive and statistically significant. 
Given the influence of the country’s macroeconomic factors on 
the country-level data, we suspect that the evidence presented 
in Column (1) might be driven by the countries' macroeconomic 
climate and not only by the environmental tax. Therefore, we 
controlled for macroeconomic factors such as interest rate, GDP 
and inflation. However, the results remained unchanged (i.e. the 
impact of an environmental tax on SMEs’ financing constraint). 
The results further showed that governance factors (i.e. political 
instability, corruption, regulatory quality and government 
effectiveness) significantly moderate the relationship between 
environmental tax and SMEs’ Innovation.  
Our results suggest that environmental taxes impact SMEs’ 
innovation, but finance constraint negatively impacts 
innovation. These findings support the resource-based view 
theory in that finance is a significant motivator for SMEs’ 
innovation. It encourages them to respond to the impact of 
environmental taxes by pursuing policies that mitigate the 
impact of environmental taxes. These findings suggest that 
environmental taxes (push factors) need to be accompanied by 
additional stimulus (pull factors) to encourage SMEs to shift 
towards innovation and the adoption of clean technologies.  
Empirical findings of the study have implications for 
governments, policymakers and practitioners in OECD 
countries to encourage green innovation. There is the need to 
re-examine the mechanism to encourage green innovation 
without negatively impacting SMEs access to finance. Firstly, 
policymakers should ensure that environmental taxes 
complement the public sector initiatives that enable SMEs to 
innovate. Secondly, policy measures should consider the 
macroeconomic and governance environment to further the 
agenda for environmental management. Thirdly, more attention 
should be paid to the potential negative impact of 
environmental taxes on SMEs financing as a means to 
encourage green innovation.  
The limitations of this study are: First, not all economies in 
the sample have well developed financial environment and 
taxation systems; thus, we ought to be mindful that 
environmental taxes will affect countries in the sample 
differently. Secondly, given that we focused on the OECD 
countries; the findings might not be generalised to other 
countries where the effect of environmental taxes on SMEs’ 
innovation may differ depending on the social-economic 
factors. Thus, the result might not be replicable in different 
countries. Another limitation worth acknowledging is that our 
study covered a limited period from 2000 to 2019. thus, our 
results may suffer from an in-depth chronology.   
Future studies should focus on cross-country data to examine 
the impact of environmental tax to optimise the tax policies 
targeting behaviour change. In addition, subject to data 
availability, future studies should segregate the different types 
of firms, sectors, intensity of carbon emission and their 
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